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Hungary has gone through its third democratic election
since the systemic changes in 1989. There is clear
continuity in the foreign policy goals of the government,
including Euro-Atlantic integration efforts (Hungary became
a NATO member in March 1999, and is expecting to acquire
accession to the European Union in the near future). The
priority of building good relations with the country’s
neighbors remains strong.
Hungary has gone through military reform. By the end
of 1997, it had finished the quantitative phase. In the
second phase, the goal is to introduce qualitative changes,
including defense strategy and technological modernization
of the armed forces. Another key element is to perfect
full-fledged democratic and civilian control over the armed
forces.
Hungary has been working on the issue of good-
neighborly relations. The country has successfully mended
historic ties with most of its neighbors. This
reconciliation is in the interest of the countries
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Hungary’s political, economic, and social structures
changed profoundly between spring 1989 and spring 1990.
After four decades, multiparty democracy and the free
market replaced the one-party Communist system and the
command economy.
This systemic change represented an embrace of new
values, which in turn have determined the main direction of
Hungarian foreign policy. Integration into the Euro-
Atlantic community through accession to NATO and the
European Union has been a priority of both the present and
previous governments. Efforts to improve and broaden
Hungary’s relations with neighboring countries have been an
important part of this endeavor, ending historic tensions,
achieving reconciliation, and fostering mutual confidence.
July 1997 will be remembered as a significant date in
Hungary’s Euro-Atlantic integration process. At the Madrid
Summit, Hungary, along with the Czech Republic and Poland,
were invited to start accession talks with NATO. A few days
later, the European Commission released a statement
confirming that Hungary was capable of meeting the
xii 
 
obligations of European Union membership and was prepared
to start accession talks to this end.
NATO’s decision in Madrid and accession in March 1999
has opened the way for Hungary to become a full member of
the community of democracies. This decision carried a clear
message: the Euro-Atlantic community recognized the efforts
made by Hungary to strengthen its political, economic, and
social stability and to meet the criteria of accession, and
it valued Hungary’s contribution to strengthening security
in Central and Eastern Europe.
In seeking to join NATO, Hungary was not motivated by
the fear of a military threat. Its determination to become
a member of the Alliance was based on shared values and the
desire to contribute to a favorable security environment.
For Hungary, NATO enlargement represents the eastward
expansion of the region of security and stability in
Europe. Hungary wanted to be part of this region, and to
enjoy the benefits of security that NATO membership
guarantees. At the same time, Hungary clearly understands
the obligations of membership and intends to make its
contribution to mutual defense and enhanced security and
stability in its region and Europe as a whole.
xiii 
 
Security in Europe can only be effectively guaranteed
by the creation of a European security architecture that
establishes links among various bilateral and multilateral
security structures, organizations, and institutions. The
Euro-Atlantic organizations are the key pillars of this
security architecture. NATO plays a particularly
significant role since it possesses the only convincing
military capability that can deter threats and, when
required, enforce the peace.
Bilateral basic treaties between neighboring states
also contribute to the emerging security structure in
Europe, and Hungary has concluded a number of such
treaties. Those concluded with Slovakia and Romania go
beyond bilateral relations since these treaties also
contribute to regional stability. They confirm the
inviolability of borders and mutually renounce territorial
claims, thus removing historical mutual mistrust. They also
provide for the respect of the rights of national
minorities, in accordance with European standards,
providing a new legal instrument for preventing the
emergence of new tensions.
While these basic treaties provide a comprehensive
framework for developing bilateral relations, settling
xiv 
 
disputes and preventing the emergence of new problems, they
are only the institutional precondition to improving
bilateral relations. The actual creation of good-neighborly
relations depends on the efforts and goodwill of the
parties to these treaties.
Although Hungary has already taken important steps,
there is still intensive work to be done. The country must
continue reform and modernization of the military,
achieving further progress in interoperability and
compatibility. Economic conditions necessary to carry the
financial burden of membership must also be created.
Hungarian foreign policy also faces challenges.
Hungary must remain committed to assisting its neighbors
who wish to join NATO as soon as possible. In Hungary’s
opinion, the enlargement process must continue, avoiding
even temporary lines of division.
1 
I. INTRODUCTION
The year 1999 brought significant changes for Hungary.
The country, together with Poland and the Czech Republic,
became a member of NATO on March 12. On that day, Hungarian
Minister of Foreign Affairs Janos Martonyi deposited
Hungary’s NATO accession document with the United States in
the Truman Library at Independence, Missouri, along with
Poland and the Czech Republic.
Below is a press dispatch from Budapest, Hungary:
On March 12, the NATO flag flying in front of
Hungary’s contact embassy - the Royal Netherlands
- was lowered and given to Premier Viktor Orban.
The move symbolized that from that day, Hungary
was a NATO member in its own right.
The Grenadier Guards of the United Kingdom also
participated, laying a wreath at Heroes’ Square
of Budapest.
In Norfolk, Virginia, the flags of the three new
members were officially raised and similar
ceremonies took place in Mons, Belgium and
Naples, Italy.1
How did a journalist see Hungary join NATO?
So it finally happened, but with none of the pomp
and grandeur you might have expected.
A simple flag lowering and raising ceremony at
the Royal Netherlands Embassy and an exchange of
handshakes and Hungary was a member of NATO.
                                                 
1 Budapest Sun Online, Volume VII, Issue 11 (18 March 1999) at
http://www.budapestsun.com [15 May 2001]
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It might seem a low-key response, and in the
literal sense of the phrase it was. But it was
more than that. It was the dignified, solemn
response of a country which is becoming ever more
mature as a democracy.
[…]
This is the same country that somewhat surprised
NATO, which had assumed everyone would want to
join, no questions asked, when it insisted on
holding a referendum and getting public backing
first.2
Indeed, Hungary wanted to join NATO and it was among
the first former Eastern Bloc countries that expressed
their intention to do so.3
Janos Martonyi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Hungary stated in his speech in Independence,
Missouri:
[…] Let me thank the governments and legislatures
in the member states, all those who supported the
cause of our membership. They understood that we
wanted to join NATO for the same reason for which
no member wants to leave it. They know that, by
joining the Alliance, we want not to win but to
prevent wars. […] For us, it is a matter of vital
importance that other states of the region remain
committed to joining NATO. Hungary will support
their aspirations in two ways. First, we shall
prove that new members can indeed add to the
weight of the Alliance. Second, we will continue
                                                 
2
“Of NATO days and National Holidays”. Budapest Sun Online, Volume
VII, Issue 11 (18 March 1999) at http://www.budapestsun.com [15 May
2001]
3 For Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Gyula Horn’s statement see
“Upheaval in the East: Hungary; Budapest Broaching a Role in NATO”. The
New York Times, 24 February 1990. Available (online): LEXIS-
NEXIS/NEWS/MAJPAP (HORN AND NATO) [6 February 2000]
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to engage prospective members and to have a
meaningful partnership with them.4
This thesis describes Hungarian foreign policy (with
special regard to its neighboring states) and military
affairs, as well as the way Hungary implemented these goals
during the first two years in NATO.
This process required multi-faceted labor of policy
maker, soldier and many others. Here is an illustration:
the arrival of the earlier mentioned British Guards was not
without problems, special permission was needed for the
soldiers to cross neutral Austria and an Act of Parliament
was necessary for them to enter Hungary, which still has to
alter rules allowing NATO troops access.5
The thesis also provides a brief history of Hungarian
quest for security after the systemic change of 1989.
Finally, it concludes that Hungary has to put more
effort in reforming its military and, due to its stated
attention toward Hungarian minorities living in the
                                                 
4 For the full text of the speech see
http://www.mfa.gov.hu/Szovivoi/Korabbi/1999/Martonyi_beszed/Deposit-
EN.htm [16 May 2001]
5 Source: Budapest Sun Online, Volume VII, Issue 11 (18 March 1999)
at http://www.budapestsun.com [15 May 2001]
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neighboring countries, must demonstrate patience and
tolerance in handling its arguments with those states.
5 
II. FROM INDEPENDENCE TO INDEPENDENCE,
MISSOURI6
 
There are numerous analyses of the latest NATO
enlargement. The following chapter gives an overview of
Hungary’s road to NATO from the Hungarian perspective.
A. THE BEGINNING
Hungary’s earliest contacts with NATO go back to the
end of the 1980s. It was in 1988 that the political parties
important in Hungary’s recent history emerged and the
Government accepted a NATO invitation. In November, Deputy
Foreign Minister Gyula Horn addressed the Hamburg meeting
of the North Atlantic Council. He welcomed the beginning of
a direct dialogue between the Warsaw Pact countries and
NATO members; he also welcomed the development that
Hungary, the first of the Warsaw Pact countries to do so,
had made contact with the Council of Europe.
                                                 
6 On 12 March 1999, after completion of their own national
legislative procedures, the Foreign Ministers of the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland deposited instruments of accession to the North
Atlantic Treaty in a ceremony in Independence, Missouri, in the United
States. This marked their formal entry into the Alliance.
6 
In February 1990, Gyula Horn, already Foreign
Minister, announced at a meeting of the Society of
Political Sciences that a close connection with the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization would be established, and he
could even envisage the possibility that Hungary could one
day become a member of one or the other political bodies of
NATO.
He said that the simultaneous disbandment of the
Warsaw Pact and NATO in the current situation was an
illusion. He suggested transforming the Warsaw Pact into a
consultative and co-coordinative body, stripping away all
its decision-making powers.
One has to seize every opportunity for this
confrontation to be built down. One way is to
develop close ties, which can lead to
cooperation. I don’t exclude a case where Hungary
and other Warsaw Pact countries could join NATO’s
political organizations. It would be a mistake to
exclude this possibility in a united Europe.7
This speech caused a great stir, especially since it
was presented on Hungarian television as if the Foreign
Minister had spoken about the possibility of Hungary’s
joining NATO. The Soviet government was dismayed by
Hungary’s drifting closer to NATO, and made its dismay
                                                 
7
“Upheaval in the East: Hungary; Budapest Broaching a Role in
NATO”. The New York Times, 24 February 1990. Available (online): LEXIS-
NEXIS/NEWS/MAJPAP (HORN AND NATO) [6 February 2000]
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clear through diplomatic channels. When Horn delivered the
speech, however, Budapest already had Moscow’s word on the
withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Hungary, and the text
of the agreement had been prepared for signature. But the
Warsaw Pact was still in existence, and Moscow made it
clear that it wished to maintain the organization.
The need for NATO guarantees was perceived around that
time. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops, there was a
general anxiety over the possibility of a power vacuum in
the region and a belief that only NATO could prevent this.
It was generally felt that, in the case of a Soviet
restoration neither the UN nor the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), would be able to offer
effective help.
After the first free elections in 1990, Prime Minister
Jozsef Antall acted cautiously in foreign policy. Without
actually mentioning NATO membership, he considered a
gradual disengagement from the Warsaw Pact and the
strengthening of ties with the European Community his most
important objectives. On Antall’s initiative, Parliament
passed an important resolution in June 1990. The House
instructed the Government to start negotiations over
Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, “in view of the
8 
fundamentally changed circumstances compared to the
conditions prevailing at the time of signing the Pact.”
In the meantime, the Government’s intermediate goal
ought to be the suspension of Hungary’s participation in
the military structure of the Warsaw Pact.8
Also in June 1990, during a visit to Brussels, Antall
had talks with Secretary General Manfred Wörner— the first
head of government from a former Soviet block country to do
so.9
At that time NATO membership still seemed to be an
unrealistic goal in the Hungarian Government’s opinion.
However, for Hungary, NATO was the guarantee of European
stability. While the country had great esteem for the
international agreements, Helsinki and CSCE, it regarded
NATO as the only effective organization to guarantee
security. Much thought was given to the possibility of
Hungary becoming neutral.10 Several politicians argued for
neutrality, while others pointed out that, with the Cold
War over, that status had become meaningless. It also
                                                 
8 For the full text of resolution see the archive of Hungarian laws
and parliamentary resolutions at
http://www.complex.hu/kzldat/O90H0054.HTM/O90H0054.HTM [16 May 2001]
9 Kun, Joseph C. Hungarian foreign policy: the experience of a new
democracy. Praeger, Westport, Conn., 1993. p 80.
10 Hungarian Foreign Policy, p 51.
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seemed unlikely that the great powers and the neighboring
countries would recognize Hungary’s neutrality by an
international treaty, as had been the case with Austria in
1955.
The idea of joining NATO revived in 1991. The last
Soviet soldier had left Hungarian territory in June; the
Warsaw Pact was abolished on July 1; and the Soviet Union
itself fell apart at the end of the year.
The North Atlantic Council made an important gesture
in August 1991, when, on the third day of the attempted
coup in Moscow, it discussed the situation. The Foreign
Ministers attending the meeting issued a declaration, in
which, in reference to the anxiety in Central and Eastern
European countries, they stated:
Last June in Copenhagen, we stated that the
consolidation and preservation throughout the
continent of democratic societies and their
freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation
are of direct and material concern to us. Noting
the enhanced concern of Central and Eastern
European states, we reiterate our conviction that
our own security is inseparably linked to that of
all other sates in Europe, particularly to that
of the emerging democracies. We expect the Soviet
Union to respect the integrity and security of
all states in Europe.11
                                                 
11 Statement issued by the North Atlantic Council Meeting in
Ministerial Session at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 21 Aug. 1991. The
full text is available on NATO website at
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c910821a.htm [16 May 2001]
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This was a plain warning to Moscow, which it could not
afford to ignore, regardless of the outcome of the coup.
The primary goal of Hungary was undoubtedly the
declaration and institutionalization of the country’s
Western orientation.12 Hungary wanted to return to the place
where it always thought it rightfully belonged. Although it
developed Western-type democratic institutions after the
political transition, and opened its borders, the political
elite and the general public thought that Hungary’s full
return to the West was not possible without membership of
the two most important Western organizations, the European
Union and NATO. Since it had soon become obvious that
joining the Western-European integration was going to take
quite a long time, people’s attention was concentrated on
the North Atlantic Alliance.
The historical consciousness of the political class
also played a part in the efforts to achieve integration
with the West. The fundamental fact here is that the
Hungarian nation had no such thing as an independent state
from the 16th century right up to 1918, and the period of
independence between the two World Wars was cut short by,
first, the expansion of the Third Reich and then that of
                                                 
12 For the defined priorities of Hungarian foreign policy see
Hungarian Foreign Policy, p 69.
11 
the Soviet Empire.13 Different generations of the political
class had historical experiences of the attempts to revise
the Trianon Peace Treaty, the experiences of the Second
World War, the persecution of Jews, the terror of the
Rakosi era, the crushing of the Hungarian Revolution of
1956 and the Prague Spring of 1968, followed by the
introduction of martial law in Poland. All contributed to a
syndrome of which the absence of a predictable future
formed a part.
At the same time, Central Europe also realized that
after the Second World War, the developed countries of the
West achieved long-term stability. Nobody worried about the
possibility of military conflict between the countries of
the Euro-Atlantic region anymore.
In the other half of the continent, in the various
successor states of the former Soviet Union, people found
themselves living under conditions of permanent
instability. For them the year 1991 brought the beginning
of another turbulent period, rather than the promise of
stability. In the light of this, it was understandable that
the Hungarian political class did not want to be trapped in
a “gray zone”, in the periphery of the stable region.
                                                 
13 For more information about history of Hungary see Peter F. Sugar,
ed., A History of Hungary. Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1990.
12 
The new developments in Russian foreign policy also
helped shape public opinion. These years witnessed the
realignments in domestic politics in Moscow; both the
nationalists and the so-called centrists became critical of
Yeltsin’s leadership for its alleged Western sympathies.
A number of Russian declarations seemed to serve no
other purpose than calling the world’s attention to the
point that the Russian federation continued to be a great
power, whose specific interests were not to be ignored in
foreign relations. Moscow believed that if it stopped
emphasizing Russian interests at every available
opportunity, the world would soon ignore Russia and
relegate it to the rank of medium powers.
All this was accompanied by economic and political
instability in Russia. The impression in Budapest was that
the declining performance of the Russian economy could lead
to a serious imbalance, and that the future in Russian
domestic politics was also unpredictable.14
It was clear that by joining NATO, the Hungarian
Government could participate directly in the Alliance’s
political and military decision-making bodies as well as in
                                                 
14 For a thorough analysis of the situation in Russia during the
given period see David S. Yost, NATO transformed: the Alliance’s new
roles in international security. United States Institute of Peace
Press, Washington DC, 1998. pp 81-88.
13 
the work of its administrative apparatus, allowing the
development of closer and more regular contacts with the
leading political circles of the Euro-Atlantic region.
Budapest realized that the Alliance had developed a complex
mechanism of consultation, which was being used to great
advantage in exchanging foreign political information
regarding both member and non-member states. Indeed, in
some respects member states shaped the foreign policy of
the West within the framework of the Alliance. In
consequence, Hungary could not be indifferent whether this
foreign policy was being defined with or without Hungarian
participation.
Naturally, security considerations also helped to
shape the views of the political class, namely that NATO
membership would guarantee the country’s defense. Once a
NATO member, Hungary could feel virtually resistant to
foreign aggression, since it would be backed by military
might that could deter any state from the use of armed
force. This factor obviously came into play in connection
with the war in neighboring Yugoslavia.
NATO membership, in an indirect way, may increase
internal security. Political integration within NATO, along
with the intensive communication between political elites
14 
and governments, could favorably influence democratic
developments in new member states.
Several Hungarian politicians declared that the
economic consequences of the country’s NATO membership
could also be beneficial. The import of foreign capital
would increase, as investors usually regard stability and
security as crucial factors. Furthermore, joining NATO also
seemed a rational and cost-effective way to modernize
Hungary’s military defense. For more than a decade, the
Hungarian armed forces have added no new weaponry to their
arsenal, except for the fighter planes received from Russia
as part payment of its debts to Hungary. Modernization was
unavoidable, if Hungary wanted its army to remain a
credible and capable force. NATO member states, however, do
not have to develop the full range of protection, it was
argued, as this is precisely one of the great advantages of
military integration. NATO membership could offer a level
of security, which would not require military expenditure
beyond Hungary’s present economic capabilities.
B. PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE
Due to the diplomatic efforts by the Central European
countries, as well as to the revised position of the
Clinton administration, by late 1993 the leading NATO
15 
countries had come to accept the idea of expansion. The
communiqué approved at the January 1994 session of the
North Atlantic Council included the following:
We reaffirm that the Alliance [...] remains open
to membership of other European states. [...] We
would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to
democratic states to our East, as part of an
evolutionary process, taking into account
political and security developments in the whole
of Europe.15
Budapest seized the offered opportunity. In February
1994 Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky signed the Framework
Document containing the most important elements of the
program known as Partnership for Peace (PfP), which was
subsequently ratified by the Hungarian Parliament.
The next stage came when the Hungarian envoy handed
over the Presentation Document containing the Hungarian
position. The Individual Partnership Program, endorsed in
November 1994 and subsequently revised several times, was
based on this document. Simultaneously with the launch of
the PfP, prospective member states were offered the
opportunity to establish diplomatic relations with NATO. Up
until January 1995, Hungary’s ambassador to Brussels
represented the country in NATO. After this the department
assigned to NATO affairs was separated from the Hungarian
                                                 
15 Sean Kay, NATO and the Future of European Security. Rowman &
Littlefield, Lanham 1998. p 92.
16 
Embassy, functioning as an Atlantic Liaison Office. In
addition, another Hungarian military liaison group was
formed to co-operate with SHAPE.
Participation in the PfP presented a serious challenge
to the Hungarian army and its military command. The
Hungarian Army, trained within the scope of the Warsaw
Pact, had to learn an entirely new way of thinking within a
relatively short period of time dealing with the concrete
tasks associated with Hungary’s admission. In the course of
an intensifying co-operation, NATO representatives let
their Hungarian partners know what they expected. In this
area, NATO officials laid emphasis on the broadening of
civil control over the military, such as adequate
regulation of the institutional and legal framework, and
better public relations and greater transparency; they
would have liked to see more civilian politicians in the
bodies controlling the Hungarian armed forces. Certain
changes have been implemented in this regard.
NATO representatives found that the general level of
foreign language skills in the Hungarian army was not very
high.16 They encouraged the Ministry of Defense to make
                                                 
16 According to a survey from Spring 1999, less than 1,700 out of
18,000 officers and NCOs of the HDF had appropriate knowledge of
English language. Source: HVG 1999/8 (27 February 1999), pp 109-112.
Available (online): http://folioweb.hvg.hu [16 May 2001] 
17 
serious efforts in language instruction. In 1995 the PfP
Military Language Training Center was established, where
thousands of officers and NCOs received language training,
mostly in English. Hundreds of officers were sent to
various Western language schools.
An obvious way to prepare the Hungarian army for
military integration was through joint exercises in
Hungary. Soldiers taking part in these events learned the
methods, work documents and procedures of NATO armies; they
also gained valuable experiences in peacekeeping,
humanitarian and rescue operations. The first Partnership
for Peace program in Hungary was a multinational command
and staff management exercise at brigade level called
Cooperative Light, which was held in 1995, followed by
invitations to four other exercises abroad that same year.17
Most of the exercises in the period up to the formal
integration were held under the aegis of the Partnership
for Peace. Among the more important exercises was
Cooperative Lantern, a command and staff management
exercise held in 1998 in Hungary, which was attended by 570
                                                 
17 Source: “Hungary and NATO: on the road to membership”, Hungary’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ website at
http://www.mfa.gov.hu/NATO/Fact-eng.html [21 April 2001]
18 
officers from 19 countries.18 Another important objective
concerned procedural harmonization, in other words the
gradual introduction of the security policies and NATO’S
doctrinal, strategic, operational, tactical and planning
procedures and principles.
The largest project within the framework of PfP was
arranged in the city of Veszprem. An Air Sovereignty
Operation Center (ASOC), mostly installed by the United
States, was set up. Brought into service shortly before
Hungary’s formal admission to NATO, the center plays a
major role in the protection of Hungarian airspace.19
The ASOC’s job is to identify all aircraft entering
Hungarian airspace, to track them and, if needed, direct
any military operation against them. For the time being,
the system transforms the analogue signals of older,
Russian-made radar equipment into digital signals, as this
is the only way to link the system with the corresponding
units of the Alliance. However, by the year 2002 three
digital radar stations with three-dimensional imaging
capability will be placed in Hungary as part of NATO’s
                                                 
18 Source: “Hungary and NATO: on the road to membership”. Hungary’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ website at
http://www.mfa.gov.hu/NATO/Fact-eng.html [21 April 2001]
19 Source: Top Gun Online, 8 February 1999. Available (online):
http://www.topgun.hu/nato/lhk.htm [16 May 2001]
19 
defense development program; this will further improve the
efficiency of the system.20
Naturally, this system will also contribute
significantly to the safety of civil aviation in the
region.
C. PARTICIPATION IN IFOR AND SFOR
After Summer 1995, when NATO launched several air
offensives against Bosnian Serb positions on the Security
Council’s mandate, thus opening the way for the restoration
of peace in Bosnia, a decision to include Hungarian troops
in the peacekeeping operation swiftly followed.
The Americans needed a logistic base in Hungary near
the Yugoslav border. In early November, they inspected the
available facilities and the base at Taszar was agreed on.
Again in that month, the Ministry of Defense informed NATO
that Hungary was ready to participate in the IFOR mission.
Ten days after the conclusion of the Dayton peace accord,
the first Americans arrived at Taszar. In December an
agreement on the transit of NATO troops was signed. Under
                                                 
20 Source: HVG 1999/8 (27 February 1999), p 110. Available (online):
http://folioweb.hvg.hu [16 May 2001]
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the Hungarian Constitution, the agreement required
Parliament’s approval, which was given that same month.
The Hungarian army sent an engineering unit to
Okucani, Croatia, where they were placed under IFOR
command. The primary task of the unit was to rebuild and
repair destroyed or damaged bridges; in addition, they had
to clear roads from mines in order to make them safe for
the movement of IFOR/SFOR units. In addition, the Hungarian
army contributed to Bosnian operations by making available,
partly or wholly, its military bases in cities of Kaposvar
and Pecs, by permitting the use of its own radio
frequencies, and by coordinating road and railway
transport.21
Relations between the Hungarian army personnel and the
other military units of the IFOR/SFOR mission have been
excellent. In recent years many American politicians and
military commanders have visited Taszar. They have all been
impressed by what they saw there. The most important lesson
for NATO about Taszar was that they could depend on co-
operation with both the Hungarian Government and army. In
                                                 
21 For details see “The Presence of IFOR/SFOR in Hungary
and the Hungarian Military Participation in Peace Operations
in the Former Yugoslavia” on Hungary’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs’
website at http://www.mfa.gov.hu/NATO/hm_ifor.html [29 May 2001]
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fact, the Alliance carried out the greatest troop movement
of ground forces in its entire history through Hungary.
After December 1995 Hungary’s geo-strategic position
undoubtedly strengthened. It became clear that the country
had and would continue to have an outstanding role in the
solution of armed conflicts along the eastern borders of
NATO. This latter factor was not irrelevant from the
viewpoint of Hungary’s admission to NATO.
In that period, a crucial part of the debate over
NATO’s expansion concerned the actual choice of the
countries. At one time certain member states would have
liked to see no more than one or two new states. To a
considerable degree, it was due precisely to Taszar and
Hungary’s contribution to the peacekeeping operation in
Bosnia that soon afterwards there were talks again of the
admission of three new members.
D. ADMISSION
The fact that the leading members of NATO asked the
Hungarian Government through various diplomatic channels to
settle its ongoing disputes with the neighboring countries,
especially the disputes concerning the Hungarian minorities
there, could be interpreted as a political condition of
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admission. The Study on NATO Enlargement stated
unequivocally:
States, which have ethnic disputes or external
territorial disputes, including irredentist
claims, [...] must settle those disputes in
accordance with OSCE principles. Resolution of
such disputes would be a factor in determining
whether to invite a state to join the Alliance.22
This was partly the reason why the Horn Government
made great efforts to prepare the bilateral treaties with
Slovakia and Romania. The Government set two goals there.
On the one hand it wished to reassure the two countries
concerned that it had no intention to revise the existing
borders; on the other hand, it tried to improve the
position of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and Romania.
The government did not wish to open a debate on the
first point. It simply reiterated the position already
declared in the bilateral treaty signed by the Antall
government with Ukraine, whereby Hungary did not have
territorial claims against its neighbors, and that it would
have no such claims in the future.23 The situation was much
more complex regarding the minority issue, as neither the
Meciar government in Slovakia nor Iliescu’s administration
                                                 
22 Study on NATO Enlargement, Brussels, 3 September 1995. Available
on NATO website at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm [16
May 2001]
23 For the texts of the Basic Treaties see
http://www.htmh.hu/bimulti.htm [13 May 2001]
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in Romania was prepared to give broad rights to the
Hungarian ethnic minorities.
Hungary concluded bilateral treaty with Slovakia in
1995. The treaty addressed the problems of both the
international borders and the national minorities. It
contained both the declaration regarding the borders, and
it guaranteed the rights of national minorities across a
relatively broad range. Hungary scored a spectacular
diplomatic success when it succeeded in having
Recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe accepted as a legally binding document in
the bilateral relations of the two countries. Of all the
multilateral documents produced so far, this recommendation
offers the broadest rights to minorities.24
The Romanian government took the treaty between
Hungary and Slovakia very badly, and had no intention of
following suit. For quite a while the negotiations offered
no hope. Nevertheless, the leading Western countries were
able to persuade Romania to change its policy. As a result,
the bilateral treaty between Hungary and Romania was signed
in 1996. This agreement also addressed the problem of the
borders and the minority issue, and although Recommendation
                                                 
24 For the text of recommendation see
http://www.meh.hu/nekh/Angol/7/coe/rec1201.htm [17 May 2001]
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1201 was relegated to a footnote, the stipulations laid
down there are as legally binding in the two countries’
bilateral relations as those contained in the main body of
the text.
The opposition parties strongly criticized the
decision to sign these treaties, and their MPs all voted to
reject ratification. In their view the treaties had serious
shortcomings, the most severe being the failure to
recognize collective minority rights and the right to
autonomy. They argued that it was pointless to sign
treaties with the Meciar and the Iliescu government anyway,
as these would not implement them in legislation.
At the same time, very little criticism was directed
against the paragraphs dealing with the border issue. This
demonstrated that by the second half of the 1990s Hungary
had got over the Trianon syndrome, which had, in one way or
another, always been present in Hungarian political life.
After the ratification of the agreements no serious
political force challenged the political consensus that
existing borders were indisputable.
In the area of minority rights, there seemed to be no
improvement under the Meciar and Iliescu governments, and
in some respects the situation even became worse. However,
subsequent elections in both Slovakia and Romania returned
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coalition governments in which Hungarian minority political
parties were junior partners, and the situation
significantly improved within two or three years.
In autumn 1995, Hungary’s NATO aspirations came under
a political threat on the domestic front. The extreme left
Workers’ Party, which was not represented in Parliament,
succeeded in getting the necessary number of signatures to
initiate a referendum on the issue of NATO membership,
which was still not an issue in domestic politics since no
formal invitation to join had been announced, and so the
public paid no attention to the problem.
Neither the coalition nor the opposition parties
supported the initiative. They thought it was a mistake to
consult the public before NATO actually issued the
invitation, along with the terms and conditions of
admission. The parliamentary parties also took into account
the fact that according to the law two years would have to
pass before the referendum could be repeated. On these
considerations the Parliament voted against holding a
referendum at that time, although it also declared that it
supported the idea at an appropriate time.
Learning the lessons from this case, the Government
started a program in December 1996 in order to increase
knowledge among the populations through the presentation of
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the purpose of the Alliance, of its activities and of the
Hungarian interests in integration. According to opinion
polls of that time, almost two-thirds of those having an
opinion on the issue were in favor of Hungarian membership
in NATO. At the same time, evaluations showed that people
who were indifferent or doubtful about membership or
rejecting the idea had no categorical or ideologically
motivated reason but knew little about NATO.
Hungary held a referendum on November 16, 1997 on the
country’s NATO membership. The voters were asked to answer
to the following question: “Do you agree that the Republic
of Hungary should provide for the protection of the country
by joining NATO?”
With 49.24 per cent turnout of the eligible voters,
the percentage of the YES answer was 85.33 per cent.25 Thus
the voters expressed their support toward NATO membership.
Prior to this referendum, on July 8, 1997 at the
Madrid Summit NATO invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland to begin negotiations with a view to becoming NATO
members.
And finally, on March 12, 1999 the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland formally became members of NATO.
                                                 
25 Source: http://www.mfa.gov.hu/NATO/OVB-eng.html [21 April 2001]
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Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary
Dr. Janos Martonyi said in his speech at the Deposition of
the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession
of Hungary in Independence, Missouri on March 12, 1999:
In the past, Hungarians often complained of
abandonment, of standing up alone. At long last,
that is over. Hungary has come home; we are back
in the family. Together will all of you, we have
just started a new chapter of history. From this
day on, we are the closest allies in our great
endeavor, the quest for peace and prosperity.26
For Hungary, joining NATO, the largest network of
security that history has ever known, was an institutional
breakthrough, and the symbol of its return to Europe.
Hungary celebrated its second year in NATO in March
2001. The two years has not been one without challenges.
NATO’s air campaign against the Milosevic regime was a
hard test for the Alliance and for all of its members.
For Hungary, the Government and the public opinion
alike, it was quite a serious challenge. The alliance that
Hungary had just joined had to start military operations
against Yugoslavia, and Hungary was providing host nation
support to operations targeting areas with a several
                                                 
26 The full text of the speech is available at
http://www.mfa.gov.hu/Szovivoi/Korabbi/1999/Martonyi_beszed/Deposit-
EN.htm [21 April 2001]
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hundred thousand strong Hungarian national community living
in them.
The Hungarian public understood very well what was at
stake: to stop ethnic cleansing, to prevent genocide, and
to restore faith in the power of common values.
Those difficult months also confirmed that Hungary got
rights and opportunities that were equal those enjoyed by
the other members. For Hungary, membership in NATO has
generated an improvement of co-ordination in the
administration and legislation. The high requirements of
membership have also had a positive effect on the process
of transformation of the country’s armed forces into an up-
to-date institution with adequate fighting capabilities.
Hungarian troops in Kosovo prove it day by day that Hungary
is contributing to security.
Hungary feels a very special responsibility towards
the issue of NATO’s further enlargement. The country’s
performance in the Alliance will have, and already has, a
direct impact on NATO’s willingness to start further rounds
of enlargement.
Close co-operation between NATO and the EU in order to
make them more effective in preventing and managing crises
is of high importance. Hungary has a deep commitment to
trans-Atlantic, and, similarly, to European co-operation in
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the field of security, and these two commitments are not in
conflict. By joining efforts, both NATO and the European
Union will be stronger, and security in Europe will
improve.
30 
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III. HUNGARIAN FOREIGN POLICY
A. THE AIM AND ROLE OF HUNGARIAN FOREIGN POLICY
Hungary, due to its geographical location, size, and
other factors, is far less able to shape its international
environment to the degree that the external conditions and
changes in these conditions influence its security,
economic and political stability. Thus, Hungarian foreign
policy has to make the most of the opportunities given by
international conditions, with attention to the objective
restrictions. At the same time, how Hungary establishes
contacts with the states that it considers important, how
it is able to join the different national groupings,
international organizations and institutions depends on
priorities.
One of the aims of Hungarian foreign policy is to
guarantee the security of the country. Foreign policy plays
a defining role in guaranteeing this security. This role
derives not only from the fact that the size and strength
of the country’s armed forces are not in themselves
sufficient for this task, but also from the fact that the
main threat in the Central-East European region as a
security policy environment comes not from a military
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strike, but from risks linked to a lack of stability.
Foreign policy has to ensure that Hungary does not have
enemies but only has allies on whom Hungary can rely in all
circumstances.
Ensuring the essential external resources and markets
for the country’s economy is a task of no less importance
for foreign policy. Hungary has relatively limited natural
resources, small domestic market, outdated economic
structure, and infrastructure. These facts make active
participation in international economic and financial
circles unavoidable. One of the basic conditions for
‘entry’ into this system of contacts is an appropriate
political climate between Hungary and those countries
Hungary looks to as future economic partners.
Balanced, settled interstate relations and a favorable
international assessment of the country can serve to
stimulate investment in Hungary too.
B. POLICY PRIORITIES
Hungary makes efforts to ensure its close ties with
the developed countries, integration into Euro-Atlantic
organizations, the creation of good neighborly relations
with the states in the region, and it supports Hungarians
living beyond the borders in their quest for recognition of
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their rights according to international documents and
norms.
Considering the close interconnection and interaction
between these three main goals27, Hungary treats them in
parallel and as being of equal importance.
1. European Integration
After centuries of isolation, the systemic changes
provided new prospects for East-Central Europe for joining
the developed, democratic Western part of the continent.
After joining NATO in March 1999, Hungary attaches special
significance to its membership in the European Union.
Accession to the Union means accepting common values on the
one hand and the guarantee of the country’s security in
economic and social terms, on the other.
Diplomatic relations between Hungary and the European
Communities were established in August 1988 followed by the
Europe Agreement signed in Brussels on December 16 1991,
establishing an associated status for Hungary to EC.28
Hungary was one of the first target-countries of the
                                                 
27 The issue of Hungary’s relations with NATO was discussed in
Chapter II.




Communities’ PHARE29 program started in 1990 that has since
provided financial assistance for economic development and
restructuring, environmental investments, R&D, public
administration, human resources development, and other
tasks serving the aim of preparation for membership.
The Europe Agreement laid the foundation for close co-
operation between the two sides. The agreed schedule has
resulted in an increasing volume of bilateral trade and EU
investments. Hungary’s economy has become increasingly
bound to the economies of the member states.
Because of consistent economic strategies followed in
the recent years, Hungary has been stabilized its economy
and has been created conditions for a sustainable economic
growth.
Hungary has welcomed the important decisions of the
Helsinki European Council of December 1999 on the further
                                                 
29 PHARE is the acronym for “Poland and Hungary: Action for the
Restructuring of the Economy”. The Phare Program is the EU’s financial
instrument designed to assist its partner countries in their transition
from an economically and politically centralized system to a
decentralized market economy and democratic society and to support the
reintegration of their economies and societies with Western Europe and
the rest of the world. Phare provides grant finance to support its
partner countries through the processes of economic transformation and
strengthening of democracy to the stage where they are ready to assume
the obligations of membership of the European Union.




development of common foreign and security policy and the
formation of a new Common European Security and Defense
Policy (CESDP).30 It would cover military operations serving
crisis management, peace making, and the establishment of
required institutional structures. Hungary, as a candidate
country to EU, member of NATO, and associated member of
Western European Union, is interested in the preservation
of the security of the EU and is ready to take an active
and proportionate part in the implementation of the
European security and defense policy.
As European integration develops, issues related to
the sense of security in civil society gain increasing
importance. After opening the EU’s internal borders and
lifting restrictions on the movements of citizens of EU and
associated countries, state frontiers will not be a real
barrier to the kind of activities that pose a threat to the
internal security of society. In this regard, the Hungarian
government concluded:
The Government is aware that concurrently with
accession Hungary must adopt the EU’s visa,
refugee, and immigration policy. Therefore, the
Government will strive to elaborate and obtain
approval for special solutions, which secure
smooth communication with citizens of neighboring
countries, particularly regarding resident ethnic
                                                 
30 Source: The European Union website at
http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/index.htm [23 April 2001]
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Hungarian minorities. These solutions should also
guarantee that EU membership should not mean
regression in Hungary’s relations with
neighbors.31
Hungary will continue its efforts to combat
international crime, corruption, and illegal migration.
Upon accession, Hungary will guarantee to apply the
provisions that relate to control of the external frontiers
of the Union.
The Berlin and Helsinki meetings of the European
Council in 1999 adopted major decisions to prepare the
Union for the next round of admitting new members.32 Berlin
approved the financial provisions facilitating enlargement,
while Helsinki undertook the political commitment to reform
EU institutions and decision-making process to suit the
requirements of an enlarged Union. The Nice European
Council successfully outlined the framework for the new
institutional system, thus removing a major obstacle on the
road leading to the accession of the most prepared
candidates.33
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“Government Program for a Civic Hungary- The new millennium is
impending.” Available (online): http://www.meh.hu/default.htm [13 May
2001]
32 Source: The European Union website at
http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/mar99_en.htm [23 April 2001]
33 For the details of the Nice European Council see
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/index.html [23 April 2001]
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Until accession, Hungary makes every effort to exploit
the opportunities given in the associate-status agreement.
The government is preparing the country for the EU
accession. This task equally comprises increasing economic
efficiency and competitiveness, harmonizing the legal
system, fulfilling the requirements of European political
culture, and informing the public in order to make clear
the advantages and the responsibilities that go with the
membership.
2. Relations with the Neighboring Countries
Good relations, and close cooperation with neighboring
countries and other states in the region are equally
important from the point of view of Hungary’s security,
regional stability, the development of the country’s
economy and expansion of market potential.
Among Hungary’s neighbors, Austria is a country with a
developed market economy and is a member of the European
Union. Hungary has common borders with three successor
states of the former Yugoslavia of which two were engaged
for years in armed conflict. Slovenia, Croatia, Slovakia,
and Romania want to move towards the European and Atlantic
institutions. However, the European and Atlantic partners
have differently assessed their preparedness: Romania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia were left out from the first wave of
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NATO enlargement. Croatia was not mentioned and Yugoslavia
is still condemned in many respects by the countries of the
Western community.34
NATO has entered into a separate agreement with
Ukraine, but neither NATO, nor the European Union expects
Ukraine to become a member of these organizations. Four
neighbor countries have not had a statehood of their own
during the course of history up to 1990. These four
neighbors are being faced with the complicated tasks of
nation–building.
Such a multiplicity of differences among its neighbors
does not make it possible for Hungary to develop relations
of the same nature with them. Hungary has conducted
successful talks with the majority of its neighbors on the
settlement of bilateral relations.
During the past few years, Hungary has signed Basic
Treaties with Ukraine, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, and
Slovakia.35
The Basic Treaties cover the mutual renunciation of
territorial claims, the recognition of existing borders and
                                                 
34 A summit of second round NATO aspirant countries took place in
Bratislava in May 2001. For coverage, see “NATO hopefuls attempt to
revive membership bids.” The Washington Times,
http://www.washtimes.com/world/20010511-14696594.htm [15 May 2001]
35 For the texts of the Basic Treaties see
http://www.htmh.hu/bimulti.htm [13 May 2001]
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improvement of cross-border movement, and the recognition,
guarantee, and practical implementation of commitments to
honor the rights of the national minorities living in each
other’s country.
As no problems have emerged in Hungarian–Austrian
relations, a similar treaty was not drawn up and neither
party considers it necessary. As far as Yugoslavia is
concerned, such an agreement would be necessary, but so
far, the events of war and its consequences have delayed
it.
The Basic Treaties directly touch two elements of the
system of Hungarian priorities in foreign policy, namely
its relationship with her neighbors and the handling of the
issue of national minorities. The two are obviously
interrelated, as the overwhelming majority of the
Hungarians who live outside Hungary, are in the neighboring
countries.
The already mentioned government program addresses the
issue of the Hungarian minorities abroad:
The Government’s policy on Hungarian minorities
abroad aims to build and develop political,
cultural, and economic ties between Hungary and
Hungarian communities abroad within the general
process of European unification, and to help
those Hungarians living in neighboring countries
to live prosperously and fruitfully in their own
homelands.
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For this reason the neighboring countries’
Hungarian population and its ties to Hungary must
be secured within the framework of law and
administration, so that the organic ties to the
mother country should remain undisturbed even
after Hungary’s accession to the European Union.36
The government considers the support of Hungarians
living beyond the borders as a political-moral obligation.
It supports the realization of their efforts to achieve
autonomy in compliance with European practice.
Hungary is aware that guaranteeing the rights of the
Hungarians beyond the borders, as well as the
implementation of these rights in practice, demands a
dialogue and normal relations with the political leadership
of the concerned neighboring states as well as broad
international support.
C. THE QUESTION OF HUNGARIAN MINORITIES
Undertaking responsibility for the national minorities
causes concern among observers of Hungarian statecraft
outside of Budapest and beyond. Many of them ask how a
government can take responsibility for the citizens of
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“Government Program for a Civic Hungary- The new millennium is
impending.” Available (online): http://www.meh.hu/default.htm [13 May
2001]
41 
other countries, and whether this wording violates the
norms that have developed in the community of democratic
states. Does not it mean an attempt to interfere into the
internal affairs of other countries and can it be
considered as Euro–conform? What is its motivation?
Hungary’s special attention to the minority issues
along its borders has lasting historical and recent
reasons.
• Nationality and citizenship are two distinct
categories. In the history of Central Europe, multi–
ethnic, multi–cultural and multi–religious empires
existed for centuries, and several nations of the
region did not develop their own statehood for a very
long time. The lack of understanding of this reality
has led to the concept of the homogenous nation state,
to a distinction between state–creating and non–state–
creating nations, and it was one of the causes of the
dissolution of the Austro– Hungarian Monarchy.37
• The Hungarians lived for a millennium – excepting the
150 years of Turkish rule – within the framework of
the Hungarian Kingdom, up to the peace treaties ending
                                                 
37 For more details about this issue see Oszkar Jaszi, The
Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. University of Chicago Press,
1966.
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World War I. Thus, the development of the Hungarian
nation much preceded the evolution of the present
states and state borders. The post–World War I peace
treaties did not partition Hungary along the
historically established administrative territorial
units, as was done later on in the case of the Soviet
Union, Yugoslavia, and the Czech Republic. As a
result, Hungary lost two thirds of its territory and
half of its population. One third of the population of
the Hungarian nation was left in the neighboring
countries.38
• The Hungarian population retains vivid memories of the
various periods of persecution of the Hungarian
minority, including acts of mass expulsions after both
world wars, different forms of discrimination and
violent policies of assimilation.
• The idea of responsibility taken by Hungarian state
policy has been strengthened by a broad acceptance of
European norms, mainly the acceptance of the idea of
respect for human and minority rights.
                                                 
38 For details of the effect of the Trianon Peace Treaties on
Hungary see Bela K. Kiraly, ed., Trianon and East Central Europe.
Columbia University Press, New York 1995.
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D. A NEW DEBATE EMERGING: THE PROPOSED STATUS LAW
The Hungarian government presented plans on April 19,
2001 to grant special rights to ethnic Hungarians in
neighboring countries, hoping to encourage them to stay in
their home countries.
Hungary fears that its prospective entry into the EU
could make the country even more attractive to the three
million ethnic Hungarians who live beyond its borders.
The plan aims to help Hungarians beyond the border to
preserve their language, culture, and national identity,
and feel at home in their respective homelands.
“Half of those currently thinking of immigration into
Hungary would change their minds if their rights here were
legally made equal to those of the average tourist, and at
the same time were helped in preserving their Hungarian
identity,” said Foreign Minister Martonyi in the
Parliament.
The plan would involve some 1.6 million Hungarians in
Romania, 600,000 in Slovakia, 350,000 in Yugoslavia,
200,000 in Ukraine, 22,000 in Croatia, 10,000 in Slovenia,
and 17,000 in Austria. These communities have lived in
neighboring states since the 1920 Treaty of Trianon carved
up Hungary after World War I. They are currently able to
travel freely into Hungary, but this will change when the
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country joins the EU and starts imposing visas on non-EU
citizens. This situation brings up worries about an influx
of migrants before Hungary’s EU entry.
The government proposes granting them the right to
work for three months legally in Hungary, as well as giving
them social and health care rights, free university
education, training courses, and travel allowances.
All parties are broadly in support of the proposal,
but the opposition Socialists, the country’s largest party,
has declared the plan should have been discussed with the
EU and Hungary’s neighbors.39
The government said that the plan fully complies with
international legal standards and with Hungary’s bilateral
accords with its neighbors.
1. Reactions from Abroad
On 20 April, 2001 the Romanian Foreign Ministry
spokesperson has announced that a committee would be set up
to analyze the (Hungarian) status law. The committee will
also study the steps that Romania may have to take
concerning the bill. The committee wants to initiate a
                                                 
39 Source: Magyar Hirlap Online. Available at
http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/cikk.php3?cikk=100000030150 [23 April 2001]
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consultation with the Hungarian Foreign Ministry to express
its view on the law.
The Greater Romania Party issued a press statement on
the law in which it said that the adoption of the draft
status law was very dangerous because it would be
interfering with the internal affairs of those countries
where Hungarians live. The Greater Romania Party firmly
protested against the potential acceptance by the Romanian
state of preferences granted by any state to its citizens,
especially if these preferences were only granted to the
ethnic Hungarian minority.
Romanian Prime Minister Adrian Nastase also expressed
concern regarding the so-called status law.40
Three days later, Slovak Prime Minister Mikulas
Dzurinda expressed concern about a Hungarian plan to grant
special rights to ethnic Hungarians in neighboring
countries.
“Putting into practice certain parts of the plan might
worsen the atmosphere in neighboring countries or between
Hungary and its neighbors,” Dzurinda said after talks with
his Hungarian counterpart Viktor Orban.
                                                 
40 Source: Magyar Tavirati Iroda (Hungarian News Agency). Available
at http://www.mti.hu/hirek/default.asp?pub=KF#43174 [23 April 2001]
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“Slovakia attributes great significance to peaceful
coexistence not only in the (central European) region but
inside its borders as well,” he added.
Dzurinda said that Slovakia would “study the plan with
great sensitivity” and expressed “hopes that there will be
a way for consultations about it with the Hungarian side.”41
Orban said he was not worried that the law would
disturb Hungary’s bilateral ties with its neighbors.42 He
said that on the contrary, it would contribute to stability
in the region.
2. Sensitivity and Tolerance
Bilateral relations are important elements of a new
security system. In Central Europe where the states and the
nations do not coincide and in many cases national
minorities culturally and linguistically are part of
another nation that may be dominant in other country, where
in the last hundred years international borders changed
frequently, and never as a result of a democratic decision–
                                                 
41 Source: Korridor. Available at
http://www.korridor.hu/cikk.php?cikk=100000008284 [23 April 2001]
42 For a more recent Romanian reaction to the Status Law proposal
see: “Romanians Envious of Hungarian Minority Rights” on the Institute
for War & Peace Reporting website at
http://iwpr.vs4.cerbernet.co.uk/index.pl?archive/bcr/bcr_20010505_5_eng
.txt [14 May 2001]
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making, the good neighborhood is the most essential
requirement of the regional and all–European stability.
Many observers have strong conviction that ethnic
issues alone could blow up the stability of Central Europe
and constitute the principle threat to the security of the
entire European continent. Others, in the contrary, say
that the Yugoslavian developments were unique and isolated,
and the existing Central European open minority problems
have not led and cannot lead to any military confrontation
between the states of the region. Nevertheless, the
minority issue does deserve special attention and caution.
It seems that Hungary should show more respect toward the
neighbors with large Hungarian populations and not being
obsessed with the mission of their safeguarding. The
stability and peace in Central Europe is still fragile. It
would be a tragic mistake to give new evidence how powerful
and destructive nationalism could be.
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IV. TRANSFORMATION OF THE HUNGARIAN MILITARY
 
A. REASONS FOR STRATEGIC REVIEW OF HUNGARIAN DEFENSE
FORCES
In the beginning of the 1990s, Hungary was not a
member of any military treaty organization, thus it had to
protect and defend the territorial integrity and
sovereignty on its own.43 Consequently, Hungary needed a
small force in peacetime, which could have been enlarged
significantly in case of a conflict. At the same time, the
Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) had outdated assets and
equipment, the maintenance of which was extremely costly.
With limited available resources, technical modernization
was implemented on a very small scale.
The Hungarian military has to comply with recent
changes in national and international politics. Hungary’s
                                                 
43 In Budapest on 25 February 1991, a “Protocol for the Termination
of the Defense Agreements Concluded within the Warsaw Treaty and
Liquidation of Its Military Bodies and Structures” was accepted.
According to the resolution, beginning with 31 March the activities of
the Committee of the Ministers of Defense were terminated, as were
those of the Supreme Command of the Unified Armed Forces, the Warsaw
Pact's Military Council, the Headquarters of the Committee on
Technology, and the Unified Air Defense System. The military treaties
of 14 May 1955, 17 March 1969, and 18 March 1980 were nullified.
Source: Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
Available (online):
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/2/introduction.htm [29 May 2001]
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NATO membership provides an enhanced security guarantee.
However, membership in NATO imposes specific obligations on
HDF.
From the perspectives of training and combat readiness
of troops, the primary objectives of the ongoing force
modernization and restructuring process are:
• to eliminate disparity between individual units and
organizations, and
• to achieve a significant improvement in training and
combat readiness level of troops and in personnel
strength of units.
Smaller personnel strength of HDF shall be balanced
by:
• concentration of forces,
• retention of necessary capabilities as well as
building of new capabilities,
• elimination of unnecessary facilities (assets that
cannot be operated economically),
• elimination of redundant equipment,
• reduction of personnel strength of background
institutions,
• reduction of personnel strength of military
leadership organizations,
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• redesign of officer and NCO training schemes,
• improvement in living and working conditions of
personnel.
B. LESSONS OF PREVIOUS MILITARY REFORMS
The HDF have been in a state of restructuring and
organizational changes since the mid-80’s. However, from
the point of view of the military personnel – with specific
regard to professional military personnel in field units –
the restructuring and reorganization process did not bring
much good.
From time to time, the personnel strength was cut
without any regard to the strengths or even the weaknesses
of individuals. Huge numbers of professional soldiers were
laid off; the forces were not managed properly and
fragmented. The remaining personnel struggled with outdated
equipment and infrastructure.
The basic missions were gradually discarded, the army
was losing their prestige in the Hungarian society, and
military personnel experienced gradual deterioration of
their living and working conditions. A great number of
officers and NCOs left the service. Field units with
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longstanding traditions were abolished or they lost their
viability.
In light of these earlier developments, it is
understandable why a new defense reform plan reminds
remaining personnel of their unfavorable experiences in the
past. Previous restructuring efforts focused upon specific
areas and resulted only in quantitative changes.44
C. GOOD INTENTIONS
The current Hungarian government issued a program
called “Government Program for a Civic Hungary - The new
millennium is impending” after the 1998 elections. This
document contained the new government’s main goals. Below
are the aims concerning the defense affairs:
The Government is deeply and unshakably committed
to European integration and the Euro-Atlantic
concept. All necessary steps will be taken to
ensure that Hungary should become a member of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1999, the
fiftieth anniversary of the founding of NATO. It
assumes all the responsibilities associated with
membership, and will create the conditions
necessary to our complete integration into the
Defense activities of NATO, from the creation of
civil control over the armed forces to the
creation of the capacity to take part in military
cooperation. […] The Government places great
importance on strengthening and realizing
                                                 
44 For details, see Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement & Central Europe,
Chapter V. NDU Press, Washington D.C., 1996.
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democratic civil control over the armed
forces…[…] The Government will ensure civil
command and control over the armed forces, and
will make the necessary organizational changes.
[…] In the interest of the improvement of the
country’s security conditions, the Government
will carry out a consistent and well thought-out
reform of national defense and the armed forces.
New basic policy principles will be put before
Parliament, reacting to changed international and
national defense conditions. After the acceptance
of the law, the Government will create, in a
short time, the national security strategy and
national military strategy of the Hungarian
Republic.45
The Government wants to reduce the length of
conscripted military service to six months. At the same
time the training system for private soldiers and reserve
troops will be reformed, and the proportion of long-service
staff will be raised to a significantly higher level.
The Government hopes, on the short term (to 1999) to
attain a basic level of NATO compatibility in the armed
forces. In the middle term (to 2004), the goal is to
increase the efficiency of the forces, and to improve the
conditions of service, living, and work of those employed
in them. In the long term (to 2010), the Government aims to
                                                 
45 Government Program, 1998. Available (online):
http://www.meh.hu/default.htm [16 May 2001]
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reach the level of defense preparedness of an average NATO
member state.46
D. NEW REQUIREMENTS
Restructuring of the armed forces will result in the
concentration of forces to create a capabilities-based
force.
The NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative, adopted at
the April 1999 Washington Summit, states:
In many cases, non-Article Five operations will
include force contributions from Partners and
possibly other non-Allied nations. […] These
developments will make new demands on the
capabilities required of Alliance forces, in
particular in the field of interoperability. […]
Significant progress has been made in recent
years in adapting Alliance forces to the
requirements of this new security environment.
However, many Allies have only relatively limited
capabilities for the rapid deployment of
significant forces outside national territory, or
for extended containment of operations and
protection of forces far from home bases. […] In
identifying the most important areas for
improvement, and with a special focus on
interoperability, the work has concentrated on
the mobility of Alliance forces, on their
sustainability and logistics, their survivability
and effective engagement capability, and on
command and control and information systems.47
                                                 
46 On 28 December 1998, the Hungarian Parliament passed the Basic
Principles of Security and Defense Policy. The document is available
(online): http://www.complex.hu/kzldat/O98H0094.HTM/MUN_3.HTM [7 May
2001]
47 NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative. Available (online):
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99s069e.htm [28 April 2001]
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In compliance with the related NATO standards and
requirements, HDF will comprise combat, combat support, and
combat service support units. Such units will be assigned
to the following categories of readiness:
• Reaction forces (immediate and rapid reaction
forces), capable of performing their missions in
Hungary and abroad, and participate in Article V or
in non–Article V type NATO operations as well.
Personnel of reaction forces will be composed
exclusively of professional and contract soldiers.
Equipment, assets, and logistic support shall comply
with that of NATO forces. Reaction forces shall be
capable of performing their mission without
additional preparations or training.
• Main defense forces, deployed in peacetime at a
relatively high level of personnel strength. These
units can achieve their full-scale readiness by
mobilization.
• Reinforcement forces (territorial defense, or
reserve units).48
                                                 
48 Source: Transformation of [Hungarian] Defense Forces. Available
(online): http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=275 [13 May 2001]
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E. AREAS OF MODERNIZATION AND RESTRUCTURING
1. Staff Integration
Currently, the commander of HDF exercises command over
HDF via four senior military leadership organizations,
namely through the Defense Staff, the Army Staff, the Air
Force Staff and the Logistics Directorate. In compliance
with the recently adopted plans, the senior military
leadership structure of HDF will be amended.
The Defense Staff will be integrated into the Ministry
of Defense. The Minister of Defense will direct HDF via the
Chief of Defense Staff. The Defense Staff will act as a
staff of the Minister of Defense and be responsible for:
• military professional planning and organizing
functions,
• preparation of decisions.
An Army Corps Command and an Air Force Command will be
established in order to perform operational command
functions. A Recruitment, Mobilization, and Training
Command as a new element of the command and control
structure will improve the quality of individual training
and enhance the efficiency of recruitment efforts.49
                                                 
49 Source: Transformation of [Hungarian] Defense Forces. Available
(online): http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=275 [29 April 2001]
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Organizations and activities that are not strictly
related to defense will be transferred to other
organizations, or they will be abolished. Consequently, the
costs of their functions and their activities will not be
financed from the Ministry of Defense budget.
In HDF will remain two military services: the Army and
the Air Force. They will be organized and trained in
compliance with the relevant NATO standards.
2. Army
After the completion of the force modernization and
restructuring process, a high level of peacetime manning
for mechanized brigades, the light mixed regiment, and
reconnaissance battalions will significantly increase the
immediate reaction capabilities of Army units and insure
their successful operations for national or Alliance needs
without the mobilization of other forces.
3. Air Force
The mission of Air Force units remains unchanged. They
are maintaining a quick alert duty within the integrated
NATO air defense system, and the Air Force has to protect
the sovereignty of the Hungarian airspace and provide air
support to the Army ground operations.
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4. Background Institutions
The number of background institutions will be reduced.
They will perform strictly military functions that include
only peacetime and wartime military unit responsibilities.
Services that require expertise other than military
skills will be purchased from civilian contractors.
These efforts should lead to a uniform system of MOD
background organizations directly subordinated to the
Minister of Defense and performing the following tasks:
• financial and economic affairs of MOD,
• development and procurement,
• military higher education.
The Chief of Defense Staff will have organizations
responsible for:
• military strategic planning,
• collecting and processing data relating to the
readiness and the daily activities of HDF,
• recruitment, mobilization, and training.
5. Allocation of Personnel
The restructuring process will bring significant
changes in the responsibilities and distribution of tasks
between officers and NCOs. With regard to the internal
ratios of the personnel, compared to the current peacetime
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personnel strength, the ratio of officers’ positions,
civilian employees, and the number of enlisted positions
will be reduced, while the ratio of NCO positions and
contract personnel will increase.
6. Location of Units
Small military organizations that have not operated in
a cost efficient manner will be transferred to central
“core” garrisons. Restructured combat organizations will
comply with NATO doctrine requirements and will meet the
relevant standards of interoperability. They will be
deployed and distributed in a more practical manner in
compliance with the security needs and requirements of the
country.
7. Human Resource Management
An effective human resource management is integral
part of the force modernization and restructuring process.
Abolishment of certain field units, redeployment of
individual units to new garrisons, and amendment of
internal ratios of personnel in rank categories will
certainly generate many problems, which require appropriate
solutions.
An objective assessment and evaluation system will be
implemented and provide a basis for professional
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development for both officers and NCOs. This will establish
competitive selection for promotions, advanced education,
and training.
Promotions to higher rank will be subject to meeting
specific requirements and will favor the most talented,
best-qualified individuals.
8. Modernization of Equipment
HDF should write off outdated types of equipment that
are considered obsolete.
Command and Control systems, including automation and
communications equipments, will be replaced with modern
capabilities. The goal is to have equipment that is at the
average technological level of partner NATO nations.
9. Schedule
The key development programs of modernizing HDF shall
comprise special projects that are subject to approval by
the Parliament, and which require constant monitoring and
review by the government. This is a prerequisite condition
for ensuring the transparency and the predictability of the
financial aspects of the related long term plans.
Phase I: Restructuring
The objectives of the first phase, which will last
until the year 2003, are:
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• to introduce new organizational structures,
• to redeploy specific units of HDF,
• to modify rank and officer/NCO ratios, and
• to improve the living and working conditions of the
personnel.
Phase II: Building of a capabilities-based force
In Phase II, which is the period until the year 2006,
programs of top priority are:
• to complete the improvement of living conditions,
• to achieve high standards of “unit” training,
• to obtain the most important military assets and
equipment.
Phase III: Modernization of equipment
The objective of Phase III (between 2007 and 2010) is
to modernize military assets and equipment. The main tasks
are:
• to finalize the procurement of military assets and
equipment,
• resolve all outstanding issues of personnel
management,
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• to finish the implementation of creating objective
ratios of personnel categories.50
F. CURRENT PROCESSES
Transformation of peacetime organizations began on 1
October 2000. The new Defense Staff organization became
operational as of 30 October 2000. In compliance with the
new command and control structure, new commands became
operational as of 1 December 2000.
The number of peacetime organizations in HDF was
reduced to half of the previous level by 30 June 2001.
Negotiations are underway among the six political
parties in the Parliament about the amendment of the
legislative framework that allows the integration of the
Defense Staff into the Ministry of Defense. The parliament
also examines the concept of introducing a 6-month versus
9-month conscript service obligation.
Military equipment that is obsolete for operational or
technical reasons is being withdrawn from active duty.
                                                 
50 Source: Transformation of [Hungarian] Defense Forces. Available
(online): http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=275 [14 May 2001]
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A security investment program of NATO – the framework
for the common development of the military infrastructure –
has been launched. The implementation of the communications
and information technology (IT), the radar, the air command
and control system, and the airfield capability packages
will cost more than 60 billion HUF ($200 million). Hungary
thus will become part of the NATO communications and IT
system, which will pave the way for the possibility of
basic, safe connection and information sharing. These
capabilities are necessary for joining NATO’s integrated
air defense system. The airfield capability package will
provide the means to provide support for NATO reaction
forces.51
A military vehicle procurement program has recently
been launched. It was necessary because the several
thousands of the vehicles of the HDF are at the end of
their life span. In order for the army to be able to
perform its training duties, virtually the entire vehicle
fleet should be replaced, which is an investment in the
                                                 
51 Source: Hungarian Defense Mirror, February 2001. Available
(online): http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=302 [10 April 2001]
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order of HUF 100 billion ($330 million), lasting at least
10 years.52
A current issue is the replacement of fixed wing
aircraft and helicopters. The government is currently53
examining the offers from two main tendering competitors:
Lockheed-Martin (F-16) and British Aerospace-Saab (JAS-39
Gripen).
Hungary has received an offer also on sale of used
Bell helicopters. There are no details available yet
regarding this issue.
G. FLAWS OF THE MILITARY REFORM
As the above examples prove, there are signs of
positive thinking and of momentum towards substantial
changes. However, the overall picture would not be complete
without warning signals. A status report by Jeffrey Simon
from June 2000 on the new NATO members summarized the
common problems regarding the military reform in these
countries.54
                                                 
52 Source: Hungarian Defense Mirror, January 2001. Available
(online): http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=584 [20 February 2001]
53 As of May 2001.
54  Jeffrey Simon, NATO’s Membership Action Plan and Defense Planning
in Problems of Post-Communism, May/June 2001, pp 29-30. 
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Political and budgetary constraints: The force
goals adopted in 1995 have not yet been
implemented, not only because of economic
constraints, but also because of a failure of
political will. Political decisions have often
been delayed or avoided because of a lack of
political interest…[…] Many senior political
leaders are uninformed, civilian specialists are
scarce, and an active defense lobby does not
exist…[…]
Planning failures: Recent force-structure reviews
indicate that the newest members lack resources
adequate for their NATO force-goal
commitments…[…]
Restructuring of military personnel: Each of the
three new members is still struggling with the
necessity of reorganizing its officer corps and
building a non-commissioned officer corps. Both
of these challenges call for the establishment of
career paths and rigorous personnel policies.
Inadequate constitutional and legal systems:
Military confusion persists over the division of
executive powers, including relations between
general staffs and defense ministries…[…]
Basic concepts: […] … Limited resources have
forced new members to adopt a piecemeal approach
to building forces. Kosovo demonstrated the
likelihood of out-of-area operations, and thus
the need for legal changes and new and different
types of armed forces. Sending units abroad
requires sustainability, different logistics, and
combat support. In addition, the European Union’s
entry into crisis management creates competing
demands and necessitates greater EU-NATO
cooperation.
Defense planning complications: There are
significant incompatibilities between partner and
NATO planning processes. This problem persists,
at least in part, because the partners do not
have enough English-language-trained personnel
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who understand NATO procedures. In addition,
partner officials seem to think that political
oversight and civilian control come about merely
by replacing military officers with civilians…[…]
Declining support for the military: The new
members failed to prepare their political elites
and the populace at large for NATO membership. As
a result, popular support for the military is
declining in all three countries…[…] …NATO action
in Kosovo in 1999 affected popular attitudes
toward membership…[…]55
All of the above mentioned problems still exist in
Hungary as of May 2001. The promised new, Western-style
human resources management has failed to emerge so far.
Those still in the military that have competitive and
transformable knowledge will leave if proper conditions
(housing, salary, working environment, foreseeable career
path) are missing.
The civilian control of Hungarian military is not
civilian at all. The state secretary and three out of four
deputy state secretaries of the Ministry of Defense (MoD)
are former generals of the HDF. The “militarization” of the
MoD, accomplished by the previous government between 1994-
1998, was a feature that the Fidesz (Fiatal Demokratak
Szovetsege, Hungarian Civic Party [HCP], the main party in
                                                 
55 Jeffrey Simon, NATO’s Membership Action Plan and Defense Planning
in Problems of Post-Communism, May/June 2001, pp 29-30.
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the governing coalition) rightfully criticized. In the
1998, Government Program the HCP stressed for civil control
of the defense affairs. Now, after three years of HCP
governing, as a journalist noted with irony, the total
civil control of MoD has come true: every civilians in the
Ministry are under military control.56
There is no, of course, danger of a military cup. The
“undressed” generals, however, may represent a danger in
another way: harmful interlocking of interests could form
among them and their uniformed subordinates.
The HCP has given a proof that it lacked the real
political will to solve the decade-old problem of the
military. After the 1998 elections, the Smallholders’ Party
(SP), as a coalition partner of the HCP, got the Defense
portfolio along with two not less important ones, the
Environmental and the Agricultural.
Being aware that the SP would not be able to run these
ministries due to lack of qualified and experienced
personnel, the HCP nevertheless let its junior partner do
serious damage in almost every place where appointees from
SP were in charge.
                                                 
56 Source: HVG 2001/9 (3 March 2001), pp 54-55. Available (online):
http://folioweb.hvg.hu [16 May 2001]
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Popular support for the military is in decline. It is
very characteristic that while ten years ago the military
colleges were among the most popular schools, now graduates
from high schools prefer going to civilian universities,
though military education remained the cheapest of all.57
There is a saying that reads in Hungarian as follows:
a rich army arms, a poor army dresses. According to this,
the HDF quickly changed its status from a poor army (a
uniform change took place in the early 90’s) to a rich one
(Hungary is planning to buy supersonic fighter-bombers).
The reality is that the performance of Hungarian economy is
not enough for such an expensive demonstration of endeavor.
High-ranking NATO officials frequently stated that changing
of command structure, modernizing of communication and IT
equipment, and enlarging of the ratio of English-speaking
personnel in the HDF are much more important than swift
change of the aging (but in some cases usable) weaponry.
Unfortunately, it seems that the Hungarian leadership is
obsessed with having high-tech aircraft (that would
certainly cause worries in some neighboring countries),
while draining the otherwise scarce budgetary sources.
                                                 
57 From the author’s personal experience as a military college
teacher.
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The hard-reached six-party parliamentary consensus,
necessary for changing the Constitution in order to promote
the military reform, is in danger. The main opposition
party threatens to withdraw from the agreement due to the
nature (or the lack) of the fighter aircraft tender. In
fact, there was no tender at all. The government, avoiding
the obligatory parliamentary commission, directly started
negotiations on acquiring of used F-16s from the United
States.58 This fact generated bad memories in the Hungarian
public.59
The overall picture about Hungarian defense report is
mixed. One could say that this performance is not worse
than those of the other two new NATO members are.
Nevertheless, there is a danger of losing momentum.
Moreover, the allies expect Hungary to fulfill its promises
and obligations. The honeymoon is over. It is time to work.
                                                 
58 Source: HVG 2001/16 (21 April 2001), pp 110-111. Available
(online): http://folioweb.hvg.hu [11 May 2001]
59 Back in June 1999, several HCP MPs lobbied for a Lockheed-Martin
(the manufacturer of F-16) official in order to help him be appointed
Ambassador of the United States to Hungary. Their effort was
unsuccessful. Source: HVG 1999/51-52 (25 December 1999), p 95.
Available (online): http://folioweb.hvg.hu [13 May 2001]
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The year 1999 in Hungary has proved to be a year where
history was made as well as commemorated and celebrated.
The final 12 months of the millennium witnessed Hungary
being welcomed back into the circle of Western nations with
its accession to NATO, and the celebration of the end to
division on the European continent with the collapse of the
Communist regimes. In this process, Hungary had played a
key role in the shape of the Pan-European Picnic at Sopron
in 1989, which proved to be the catalyst of a swift and
irreversible decline.
A. THE EFFECT OF KOSOVO
Euphoria at NATO membership was almost immediately
tempered by the outbreak of the Kosovo crisis, which served
as a reminder that Hungary had taken on a new set of
responsibilities as well as enjoying a new set of
privileges.
A united front, a spirit of sticking together was now
required, setting aside differences for the greater good.
As the air strikes continued, a temporary cease-fire was
called amongst the political “benches.”
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Hungary was suddenly confronted with the real
possibility of retaliation. Speculations arose as to what
this revenge might entail, ranging from fear of a physical
breach of the country’s territorial integrity (the Prime
Minister, Viktor Orban, was adamant on the matter of NATO’s
mutual defense guarantee should the situation deteriorate
that far), since Hungary is the only NATO member to share a
border with Yugoslavia, to attacks on the Hungarian
minority of the Vojvodina. In a particularly vulnerable
position, the Hungarian minority could have easily been the
next in line for a campaign of ethnic cleansing.
Common sense prevailed: Hungary opted for a defensive
rather than a belligerent role, authorizing the use of its
airspace by its Allies and rigorously fulfilling its
international obligations on the ground. Hungary was
consistent with the common goals - even up to damage of its
relations with Russia when Moscow objected to the way,
Hungary delayed Russian aid convoys crossing Hungarian
soil.
The Kosovo crisis brought to the surface many
deficiencies of the Hungarian Armed Forces: inadequate
equipment, insufficient training, lack of knowledge of
foreign (English) language. It was a shame that the
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Hungarian Air Force could not participate in the defense of
home airspace. The Hungarian Mig-29s were grounded because
their on-board acquisition and identification system (IFF)
was not compatible with NATO standards and thus they could
easily be mistaken by Yugoslav aircraft.
There is work ahead in the area of civil control of
the military and in human resource management as well.
Nevertheless, Hungary is on the right path. Its
contribution to the peacekeeping effort allowed proving
that, although it had not committed fighting troops, the
country was concerned to what had occurred so close to its
borders.
Ambivalence towards the whole NATO effort was
unavoidable. Hungary had to cope with the sobering
realities of what it meant to take sides. Old wounds were
very publicly reopened: politicians frequently mentioned
the bonds uniting Hungary with its “lost children” of
Vojvodina in order to drag more voters into their camp.
On 20 August [1999], ten thousand supporters of
the Hungarian Life and Justice Party (MIEP) from
all over Central Europe, including speakers from
Romania, Slovakia and Yugoslavia, gathered in
Budapest demanding a UN-supervised referendum on
Hungary’s re-annexation of northern Vojvodina to
prevent “another genocide in the area.” […] MIEP
President Csurka proclaimed that “nothing else
can ensure the safety of Hungarian lives based on
our experience of the Yugoslav situation.”
Political analysts say that MIEP, a parliamentary
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party with about five percent support, is
extremely isolated in its views. Foreign Minister
Janos Martonyi rejected Csurka’s “irresponsible
proposals,” saying that the Hungarian Government
“does not want to change the borders but the
nature of borders.” Prime Minister Orban later
stated that border revisions do not figure in the
government's program in any way. […] The
Hungarian government has gone to great lengths to
reassure its neighbors that Hungary is not
seeking territorial revisions by including such
promises in bilateral treaties.60
Hungary showed fortitude in its reaction to the
crisis. The spirit of revisionism had been finally
suppressed.
Had this issue been allowed to get out of hand, it
would have been more than a matter of embarrassment to the
Government, but would have cast doubts on its policy
towards the Hungarian minorities as a whole.
B. STEADY GROWTH
Initially, Hungarian membership of NATO was presented
as a stepping-stone towards joining the European Union
(EU). Given that Hungary had been deemed fit for active
service in the world’s strongest (and most prestigious)
military alliance, the EU could not have any excuse it
                                                 
60 Source: Central Europe Review Online, http://www.ce-
review.org/99/10/hungarynews10.html [10 May 2001]
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might have had over enlargement, at least as far as the
Hungarian candidacy was concerned.
In its 1999 regular report on Hungary’s progress
towards accession, the European Commission concluded that
“…Hungary fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria. Two
areas still need attention. The first is the situation of
the Roma [the largest ethnic minority in Hungary, about
800,000 people]…[…] The second is the fight against
corruption where recent efforts need to be reinforced.”
Concerning the basic democratic rights, the report
says:
Hungary respects the freedom of the press. The
market for news is highly competitive and the
major part of the print media and of radio and
television stations are in private hands
providing a wide variety of high-quality,
uncensored national and local information. […]61
What about the economic criteria?
Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council stated
that membership of the Union requires:
• existence of a functioning market economy,
• capacity to cope with the competitive pressures and
market forces within the Union.
                                                 
61 For the full text of the Report see the Hungarian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs’ website at http://www.mfa.gov.hu/euanyag/hu_en.html
[14 May 2001]
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According to the above mentioned report:
Hungary is a functioning market economy and the
legal and institutional structures… have been
further strengthened. It should be able to cope
with the competitive pressures and market forces
within the Union in the medium term provided it
continues to make further progress in structural
reforms.62
Although inflation had not dropped to the extent
originally hoped for, Hungary nevertheless remained the
only country in Europe where it had fallen. The year 2000
had proven to be Hungary’s most successful year so far
economically, with GNP rising above five per cent, exports
reaching a value of 30 billion euros and debt servicing
below 20 per cent compared to the 60 per cent figure at the
beginning of the 1990s.
C. MINORITIES AS ASSETS
Hungary was able to show to the world that it is a
responsible and equal partner, which can be relied upon.
Within the region as a whole, Hungary has a difficult
balancing act to perform, and here the minorities
complicate matters further. The country has made efforts to
                                                 
62 For the full text of the Report see the Hungarian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs’ website at http://www.mfa.gov.hu/euanyag/hu_en.html
[14 May 2001]
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emphasize its inclusive approach to the issue of
enlargement, that, if Hungarian accession were to take
place sooner than that of neighboring countries, Hungary
would use the advantages of being able to participate in
the Institutions as an insider to the mutual benefit of
all. NATO has been a useful forum in this respect.
Political attention has been focused on ensuring that
Hungary’s intentions are properly understood. As a
Hungarian diplomat expressed it:
I consider it important to underline that
Hungarian national minorities living in Central
and Eastern Europe represent a stabilizing factor
[the prevailing fear within the EU, exacerbated
by events in Kosovo, is that they might end up
being precisely the opposite, namely a cause of
friction and dispute]. Thus, the change in their
fortunes is closely linked with the stability of
the region and indirectly of Europe as a whole.
In Hungary, the current government has undertaken
a constitutional obligation to take account of
the situation of the Hungarian nation as a whole,
affording it legal protection and bolstering the
effectiveness of the rights it enjoys by means of
both bilateral relations and multilateral
diplomacy. Our integration efforts cannot run
counter to this constitutional commitment, so we
intend to create accession conditions which do
not lead to discrimination against the Hungarian
minorities living beyond our borders, but which
are at the same time acceptable to the European
Union and its Member States."63
                                                 
63 From State Secretary of MFA Zsolt Nemeth’s speech at the 12th
meeting of the EU-Hungary Joint Parliamentary Committee held in
Brussels on November 24-25, 1999. Source: Nepszabadsag Online, 27 Nov
1999. Available at http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Archiv/Archiv.asp?SID=1
[20 April 2001]
78 
Far from being an obstacle to accession, the Hungarian
minorities can act as a bridgehead, fostering mutual
understanding and co-operation. The most tangible and
literal symbol of it is the reconstruction of the Maria
Valeria Bridge between Esztergom of Hungary and Sturovo
(Parkany) in Slovakia. With the help of EU resources from
the PHARE Program, the bridge will stimulate trade and
boost prosperity as well as functioning as the highly
visible embodiment of a spirit of reconciliation.
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